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Abstract 
Mitchell, J.C. and E. Moggi, Kripke-style models for typed lambda calculus, Annals of Pure 
and Applied Logic 51 (1991) 99-124. 
The semantics of typed lambda calculus is usually described using Henkin models, consisting of 
functions over some collection of sets, or concrete Cartesian closed categories, which are 
essentially equivalent. We describe a more general class of Kripke-style models. In categorical 
terms, our Kripke lambda models are Cartesian closed subcategories of the presheaves over a 
poset. To those familiar with Kripke models of modal or intuitionistic logics, Kripke lambda 
models are likely to seem adequately ‘semantic’. However, when viewed as Cartesian closed 
categories, they do not have the property variously referred to as concreteness, well- 
pointedness or having enough points. While the traditional ambda calculus proof system is not 
complete for Henkin models that may have empty types, we prove strong completeness for 
Kripke models. In fact, every set of equations that is closed under implication is the theory of a 
single Kripke model. We also develop some properties of logical relations over Kripke 
structures, showing that every theory is the theory of a model determined by a Kripke 
equivalence relation over a Henkin model. We discuss Cartesian closed categories but present 
the main definitions and results without the use of category theory. 
1. Introduction 
Lambda calculus is a calculus of functions: we read the lambda term AX : a. A4 as 
‘the function defined by treating the expression M as a function of the variable x’, 
where x : (T indicates that the domain of this function is type CT. Formalizing this 
reading, it is natural to base a mathematical semantics of typed lambda calculus 
on sets of functions. When terms are given functional types in the usual way, it is 
easy to see how each term defines a set-theoretic function with the appropriate 
016%0072/91/$03.50 0 1991- Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland) 
100 J.C. Mitchell, E. Moggi 
domain and range. However, classical set theory’ entails some subtle semantic 
properties which are slightly at odds with the traditional axiom system. 
One way to see the influence of classical principles on the semantic properties 
of terms is to consider an implication presented in [18]. Suppose a and b are types 
and f is a function f : (a + a + a) + b mapping curried two-argument functions on 
a into 6. Since the two functions 
Jtl ::=Ax:u.Ay:u.x, Jr*::=hr:u.Ay:u.y 
both have type a + a --, u, we can apply f to either one. We will show, by a simple 
case analysis, that 
3c.r : u.fnl = AZ : u.fq implies fq = fn2, (*I 
In words, we will show that if the two functions Ilz : u.fn, and ilz : u.fnz are equal, 
then their values fnl and fn2 must be equal. The first case to consider is when the 
type a has no elements. If this happens, then we have ~di = ads, since both 
expressions denote the empty function, and so it must be that fnl = fn2. The 
second case is a not empty, and so there is some element u of type a. We can 
apply both functions in the antecedent o U, and since ‘equals applied to equals 
produce equals’, we obtain fnl = fq. Thus regardless of whether a is empty, the 
implication above is semantically sound. 
Although the traditional axiom system is complete for proving equations that 
are valid in all Henkin models, there is a slightly complicated relationship 
between the axiom system and semantic implication. In the traditional axiom 
system, there is no provision for reasoning by cases, and so the argument above 
cannot be formalized. However, it has been common to assume that no type is 
empty. When we make this simplifying assumption, we eliminate one case, and 
the inference is easily carried out within the appropriate axiom system. This leads 
to the completeness theorems of [5, 8, 251. The drawback, however, is that in 
many computer science applications it is not appropriate to assume every type is 
nonempty (inhabited). This point is discussed in [18]. Related discussions of 
multi-sorted equational logic appear in [6, 71. When we reject the nonemptiness 
assumption and allow types to be empty, we are led to nonequational principles, 
as in [18], which formalize reasoning by cases as above. The extended axiom 
system of [18] is semantically complete, but it has a very different flavor from the 
traditional system. For example, some useful connections between equational 
theories and #I, n-conversion fail.* In addition, we give up the usual ‘minimal 
’ We use the term set theory to mean any classical set theory, such as ZF. This should be 
distinguished from set theories developed in intuitionistic logic. As will become apparent, our Kripke 
lambda models are essentially a semantics of typed lambda calculus developed in a form of 
intuitionistic set theory. 
*Here is one example, based on the results of [ll]. We write M &-b N is there is a term P with 
PUV =B,s M and PVU =p,q M. Then in the traditional inference system for typed lambda calculus, we 
have Cl = V t M = N iff M .(I.v . . . 0.v N. This fails when the new inference rules for empty 
types are added. 
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model’ property of lambda calculus and equational logic: with empty types 
allowed, there is a set of equations which is closed under semantic implication, 
but not the theory of any single model. 
It is worth noting that these comments hold true whether we describe models 
using the language of set theory or category theory. As proposed in [23, Section 
21, one might choose concrefe Cartesian closed categories, those satisfying 
iff foa for all a:l+A, 
as use the concrete has been adopted in much of the 
computer science literature, but it is not standard in category theory. An 
alternate phrase is to say that 1 is a generator or the category has enough pods.) 
Since any object A of a concrete category may be identified with the set of arrows 
a : 1 +A from the terminal object, our discussion of Henkin models above applies 
to concrete Cartesian closed categories as well. In particular, the traditional 
inference system is not complete for semantic implication over concrete Cartesian 
closed categories when ‘empty’ objects are allowed. 
The goal of the present paper is to give a natural set-like semantic account of 
the traditional inference system. To do this, we must find a semantics which does 
not support the classically valid justification of (*). Since the argument assumes 
that either a is empty or a is not empty, the law of the excluded middle is used in 
a critical way. Thus one might expect an intuitionistic semantics to provide a 
completeness theorem. Since categorical logic is essentially intuitionistic, the 
equivalence between typed lambda theories (defined using the traditional axiom 
system) and arbitrary Cartesian closed categories could be considered an 
intuitionistic completeness theorem (see, e.g., [4, 13, 141). However, we prefer 
the completeness theorem using only Kripke models for several reasons. For one, 
Kripke models are relatively easy to picture, and they seem to support a set-like 
intuition about the lambda terms better than arbitrary Cartesian closed categories. 
In addition, predicate logic may be interpreted over Kripke lambda models, while 
there is no analogous interpretation in arbitrary Cartesian closed categories 
(except indirectly via the Yoneda embedding). A practical advantage is that it is 
often easy to devise Kripke counter-models to implications like (*). Finally, the 
useful techniques of logical relations generalize to Kripke lambda models without 
much difficulty and provide an easy way to construct Kripke lambda models from 
Henkin-like structures. 
We define Kripke lambda models in Section 2 and describe the axiom system 
and the semantics of terms in Section 3. In Section 4, we discuss the relationship 
between Kripke lambda models and Cartesian closed categories (CCCs): every 
Kripke model determines a CCC, and (as pointed out to us by Edmund Robinson 
and Pino Rosolini) every small CCC may be embedded in a Kripke model. We 
prove soundness and completeness theorems in Section 5, along with a cor- 
respondence between nonempty types and intuitionistically valid propositional 
formulas. Finally, in Section 6, we turn our attention to logical relations. We 
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describe some general properties of Kripke logical relations, which are closely 
related to Z-relations [21], and show that a general class of Kripke models may be 
obtained as Kripke quotients of classical models. As an application of Kripke 
quotients, we construct a counter-model to the implication (*) given in the second 
paragraph of the paper. 
While we began our study of Kripke lambda models by working out a definition 
from first principles, our model definition and many of our results may be 
developed using a paradigm that is well known to researchers in categorical ogic. 
We are grateful to Edmund Robinson and Pino Rosolini for some helpful 
discussion of this point of view, and refer to the reader to [3, 14, 231 for elated 
discussion. In short, the usual definition of semantics of typed lambda calculus, as 
in [l, 5, 81, may be formalized in the language of set theory: a model is a 
collection of sets satisfying several properties easily described by logical formulas. 
While we usually interpret this definition in the ‘standard classical model’ of set 
theory, other interpretations are possible. In particular, our definition of Kripke 
lambda model may be viewed as an explicit description of the meaning of typed 
lambda model in a class of Kripke-style interpretations of an intuitionistic set 
theory. In categorical terms, these interpretations of set theory are functor (or 
presheaf) categories Set “, where 9 is a poset. Since much of the development 
seems entirely routine from this point of view, we will use the Kripke 
interpretation of logical formulas to motivate parts of the model definition. We 
should emphasize that in topos theory, a ‘Kripke model’ is just an interpretation 
of a first-order signature in a presheaf category over a poset, as it will become 
clear from the discussion in Sections 2 and 4. 
2. Kripke lambda models 
2.1. Possible worlds 
As with other Kripke-style semantics, a Kripke lambda model will include a 
partially-ordered set %f of ‘possible worlds’. Instead of having a set of elements of 
each type, a Kripke lambda model will have a set of elements of each type at each 
possible world w E W: The relationship between elements of type o at worlds w 
and w’ 2 w is that every a: (T at w is associated with some unique a’ : (J at w’. 
Informally, using the common metaphor of G as relation in time, this means that 
every element of o at w will continue to be an element of u in every possible 
w’ 2 w. As we move from w to a possible future world w’, two things might 
happen: we may acquire more elements, and distinct elements may become 
identified. These changes may be explained by saying that as time progresses, we 
may become aware of (or construct) more elements of our universe, and we may 
come to know more ‘properties’ of elements. In our case, the properties of 
interest are equations, and so we may have more equations in future worlds. 
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Since a type u may be empty at some world w and then become nonempty at 
w’ z= w, some types may be neither ‘globally’ empty nor nonempty. 
2.2. Applicative structures and predicate logic 
Kripke lambda models will be defined precisely using the subsidiary notion of 
applicative structure. A Kripke applicative structure 
xz=(W, s, {A3, {APPZ”), {CC,,>) 
consists of 
l a set ‘V of ‘possible worlds’ partially ordered by G, 
l a family {A:} of sets indexed by types o and worlds w E ‘hf, 
l a family { Appz “} of ‘application maps’ Appz”: A:+” x AZ+ A: 
pairs of types u, r and worlds w E W, 
l a family {i&,,,} of ‘transition functions’ i&,,, :AE+A$ indexed by 
pairs of worlds w < w’, 
subject to the following conditions. We want the transition from A: 
the identity 
1 ‘;,,:A;+A:: is the identity, 
and other transition function to compose 
indexed by 
types o and 
to A: to be 
(id) 
(camp) 
so that there is exactly one mapping of A: into A$ given for w s w’. We also 
require that application and transition commute in a natural way: 
Vf EAE-“Va EA~i&,~ (AppZ”(f, a)) = App3”((CYf 1, (ilL,a)h (natI 
which may be drawn 
A 
,n-,X,” 
T T 
#’ 
A :-‘xAZ q A; * 
and will be described informally below. This completes the definition. 
If a E A”, and w < w’, then we can read i”,,,Ca E A$ as ‘a viewed at world w”. 
The purpose of the application map App$” is to associate a function Appz”(f, .) 
from A: to AC with each element f EAT*‘. Since we can view f E AZ*” as an 
element at any future world w’ 3 w, the application map at world w’ also 
associates a function with i”” ,,,,f at w’. The condition (nat) as intended to give a 
degree of coherence to the functions associated with different view off. Basically, 
(nat) says that if we apply f to argument a at world w, and then view the result at 
a later world w’ 3 w, then we see the same value as when we view f and a as 
elements of world w’, and apply f to a there. 
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Kripke applicative structures can also be defined using category-theoretic 
concepts. The usual definition of applicative structure (also called a prestructure; 
see [5, 251) may be understood in any Cartesian category. The usual definition of 
applicative structure is a pair ( {A “}, {App”} ), where {A”} is a family of sets A” 
indexed by types and {App”} is a family of application functions 
App”” : A a-r~Ao+A’: 
indexed by pairs of types. We may interpret this definition ‘inside’ a category % 
by regarding the word ‘set’ as meaning ‘object from %’ and ‘function’ as meaning 
‘morphism from V’. Thus an applicative structure in % is a collection of objects 
{C’} indexed by types and a collection of morphisms {App%“} indexed by pairs 
a, t of types such that AppRz has the domain and codomain given above. To 
derive our definition of Kripke applicative structure from this general idea, we 
regard a poset (“ur, G) as a category in the usual way (see Section 4), and 
consider the category Set (w,G) of functors from (W, <) to sets. If we work out 
what applicative structure means in a category of the form Set(w.G), then ‘sets’ 
will be functors and ‘functions’ natural transformations. So we end up with 
exactly the definition of applicative structure spelled out explicitly above. We will 
say a little more about functors and natural transformations in Section 4; some 
related details may be found in [23, Section 41 and [14, Example 9.5 of Part II]. 
It is often convenient to omit the application map App, writing fx for 
Appz”(f, X) when this does not seem confusing. 
It is relatively easy to use Kripke applicative structures to interpret a predicate 
logic with quantification over all types. A brief discussion of logic at this point will 
make is easier to motivate the further conditions needed to define Kripke lambda 
models. We will use the notation 
for formula 9 holding at world w relative to variable assignment (environment) 
rl, and let d It 4 mean w It- #[q] for every world w and environment r~. Equations 
between expressions without ), are easily interpreted, and we will see how to 
interpret equations between typed lambda terms in the next section. If we take 
equations as atomic formulas, then conjunction, disjunction and existential 
quantification are straightforward. For example, 
w lt- 9 A r#[n] iff w lt- @[q] and w It r,~[q]. 
Negation is interpreted by taking 19 = # 2 I, where by definition I is a formula 
that does not hold at any w. As in Kripke semantics of propositional or first-order 
logic, implication and quantification make use of the partial ordering of worlds. 
For example, 
wI~$xV(~) iff VW’ 2 w (w’ It @[n] implies w’ 11 q[q]). 
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For this to make sense, we must be able to regard any variable assignment at w as 
a variable assignment at W’ 2 w, a technical detail we will address below. We will 
illustrate the interpretation of quantification by example below. More information 
about this interpretation of predicate logic in Set(sY’G), which is entirely standard, 
may be found in [14, 231. 
2.3. Extensional@ and combinators 
A classical applicative structure may fail to be a model for two reasons, and 
these reasons apply to Kripke applicative structures as well. The first possibility is 
that we may not have enough elements. For example, CT--, o might be empty, 
making it impossible to give meaning to the identity function JJ : ax. The second 
problem is that application may not be extensional, i.e., we may have two distinct 
elements of functional type which have the same functional behavior. Conse- 
quently, the meaning of a lambda term hx : a.M may not be determined uniquely. 
The usual statement of extensionality is that f = g whenever fx = gx for all x of 
the appropriate type. In Kripke applicative structures, we are concerned not only 
with the behavior of elements f, g E AZ-+” as functions from AZ at AZ, but also as 
functions from A$ to A$ for all w’ > w. Therefore, we must specify that for all 
f, g E AZ-‘“, 
f = g whenever, VW’ 3 w Va E A$ (irWTf)a = (i~~~‘g)a. 
This can be said a little more simply by appealing to the interpretation of 
predicate logic described above. Specifically, we will say that a Kripke applicative 
structure ti is extensional if
s&It(vX:afx=gx)~f=g, (ext) 
where the variables f and g have type u--;, r. (We ‘will discuss a syntactic 
mechanism for specifying the types of free variables in the next section.) It is a 
routine calculation to see that (ext) is equivalent to the more elaborate statement 
above with explicit quantification over possible worlds. 
There are two common ways of specifying that a classical applicative structure 
has enough elements to interpret every lambda term. The environment model 
condition uses the inductive definition of the meanings of terms, while the 
combinatory model condition uses equationally-defined elements K and S, called 
combinators (see [l, Chapter 51 or [17]). S ince the two are equivalent (for both 
Kripke and classical applicative structures), we will define models using 
combinators. 
For Kripke applicative structures, the description of K and S is simplified by 
introducing the notion of global element. A global element a : (T of .6? is a mapping 
w +-+a,,, from worlds to elements such that a,,, E A$ and, whenever w < w’, we 
have i&,,a,,, = a,,. Constant symbols in logical formulas denote global elements; 
we interpret a constant a : u at world w as a,,, E A;. A Kripke applicative structure 
& has combinators if, for any types p, a, r there exist global elements K and S of 
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types u+t--,crand (P~a~z)~(p-,a)-,p~zsuch that 
&It-Kxy=x, (K) 
szltSxyz=xz (yz). (S) 
where we assume variables x, y, z are given the appropriate types, e.g., x : (T and 
y : z in (K). In more detail, (K) means that for every world w and all ‘local’ 
elements a E A:, b EAL, we have w IF K, a b = a. Condition (S) may be spelled 
out similarly. 
We define a Kripke lambda model to be a Kripke applicative structure X$ which 
is extensional and has combinators. 
3. Terns, equations and interpretation 
3.1. syntax 
As usual in typed lambda calculus, we will be interested in equations between 
terms of the same type, but not concerned with equations between types. Since 
we wish to allow empty types, we will be explicit about the types assigned to 
variables (see [ 181). C onsequently, terms and their types are defined using the 
subsidiary notion of type assignment. A type assignment r is a finite set of 
formulas x : z, with no x occurring twice in r. The formula x : t may be read ‘the 
variable x has type t’. We write r, x : o for the type assignment 
where, in writing this, we assume that x does not appear in r. Terms will be 
written in the form r D M : z, which may be read, ‘M has type r relative to r’. 
Since open terms may define ‘partial’ or ‘nonglobal elements’, there may be some 
confusion about what it means to use a variable. In contrast to the logic of partial 
elements of [4], for example, all of our expressions will have existential import. 
When we write x : CT in a type assignment, we means that x is defined, or ‘exists’, 
and has type u. The symbol ‘D’ acts as implication with respect to existence, so 
that x : (J D M: z says, ‘for all w, if x denotes an element of type B at world w, 
then M is defined at w and denotes an element of type r’. 
The well-typed terms are defined as follows. 
x:tDx:r, (4 
rDM:a+z.l-DN:u 
l-DMN:z ’ (-+E) 
(-0 
I-,x:uDM:z 
TDhx:u.M:u*t’ 
I’DM:r 
I-,x:uDM:z’ 
(add var) 
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An easy induction shows that if P D M : u is well-typed, then P must mention 
every free variable of M. 
It is convenient to omit the empty type assignment when writing closed terms. 
In addition, since the type of a closed term is uniquely determined, we sometimes 
omit the type as well. For example, it is convenient to write Ax : ax instead of 
0 D Jx : u.x : u+ u. 
With type assignments as part of the syntactic formulation of terms, it is natural 
to write equations in the form 
TDM=N:r, 
where we assume that P D M : z and r D N: t are both well-typed. For 
typographical reasons, it s sometimes helpful to leave off the types of the terms, 
writing r D M = N instead of r D M = N: t. We will write [N/x]M for the result 
of substituting N for free occurrence of x in M. In defining [N/x]M, we must be 
careful to rename bound variables in M to avoid capture, as usual. 
We have the usual axioms for renaming bound variables, evaluating function 
application by substitution, and equating extensionally equal functions. 
I’DAx:u.M=IZy:u[y/x]M fory$FV(M), (4 
TD(iLc: o.M)N=[N/x]M, (P) 
I’DAx:u.Mx=M forx$FV(M). (rl) 
We also need a reflexivity axiom 
I’DM=M:u W) 
and several inference rules. The main inference rules are symmetry and 
transitivity: 
I-DM=N:u 
I’DN=M:u’ (v-4 
TDM=N:u,I-DN=P:u 
TDM=P:u ’ 
as well as congruence with respect to application and lambda abstraction: 
rDM,=M2:u-,z,rDN,=N2:u 
l-DM,N,=M,N,:t ’ 
(trans) 
(co4 
T,x:uDM=N:t 
rDilx:u.M=kx:u.N:u+r’ (8 
Since type assignments are explicitly included in equations, we also need the rule 
TDM=N:u 
r,x:rDM=N:u’ 
(add var) 
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This lets us add additional typing hypotheses to equations. We write Gp Fr D M = 
N: a if the equation r D M = N: CJ is provable from the equation in 8’. 
A useful fact about typing and equational reasoning is that if r D M: (J is 
well-typed, and M p, q-reduces to N, then r D N : (T is also well-typed. The 
converse fails, however, since when M /3, q-reduces to N, the term M may have 
more free variables. Therefore, r D N : CT does not imply r D M : a. 
To emphasize the difference between our proof system and the proof rules that 
apply when types are assumed not empty, it is worth mentioning that we do not 
have the rule 
l-,x:aDM=N:z 
TDM=N:r 
x $ FV(M, N), (nonempty) 
since this inference is sound only if there exists a global element of type u. 
It is interesting to observe that we have a Kripke-like structure within the 
syntax of terms or equations. We may think of a type assignment r as the 
‘possible world’ in which the variables appearing in r ‘exists’, in the sense of [4], 
or ‘are defined’. We may then read r D M : u as saying ‘M exists and has type u 
at world r’. The natural ordering on type assignments is containment, and rule 
(add var) ensures that if M is defined and has type u at world r, then M 
‘continues’ to be a term of type u at every world I” L r We can also incorporate 
equations, and read r D M = N: z as, ‘M and N define the same element of type 
r at world r’. Since more terms can be defined when we have more variables, it is 
clear that any r’ a r will have at least the elements of r. What is perhaps less 
obvious is that with respect to certain lambda theories, we may have more 
equations at I” 3 r. To take a simple example, suppose we have a constant 
c : u+ a, and let 8 be the single equation {AX : t.c = Ax : t.Ly : a.~}. At world 
r = 0, we cannot prove c = ;ly ; u.y from %. (This is most easily demonstrated by 
a semantic argument, as in Section 6.4.) However, it is easy to see that at world 
r’ = {z : t} > r, we have 8 F r’ D c = Ay : u.y. Thus the properties of the transi- 
tion functions i$+,, are well motiviated by properties of the proof system for typed 
lambda calculus. We will use type assignments as ‘possible worlds’ in proving the 
completeness theorem. 
3.2. Environments and meanings of terms 
An environment q for a Kripke applicative structure .& is a partial mapping 
from variables and worlds to elements of ~4 such that 
if r,rxw E AZ and w’ 3 w, then nxw’ = i~,,.(~xw). (env) 
Intuitively, an environment r] maps a variable x to a ‘partial element’ r]x which 
may exist (or be defined) at some worlds, but not necessarily all worlds. Since a 
type may be empty at one world and then nonempty later, we need to have 
environments uch that nxw is undefined at some w, and then ‘becomes’ defined 
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at a later w’ 2 w. We will return to this point after defining the meanings of 
terms. 
If rl is an environment and a E A:, we write n[a/x] for the environment 
identical to r,r on variables other than x, and with 
(n[a/x])xw = ic+,.a 
for all w’a w. We take (r,r[u/x])xw’ to be undefined for w’ not aw. 
If 7 is an environment for the applicative structure &, and r is a type 
assignment, we say w satisfies r at r], written w IF r[ n] if 
r~xw E A:: for all x : 0 E r. 
Note that if w It r[q] and w’ 3 w, then w’ Il- T[q]. 
For any Kripke model & and environment w IF T[q], we define the meaning 
[r D M : &tw of term r D M : (T in environment 77 at world w by induction on the 
structure of terms: 
[r D x : a]lqw = qxw, 
[r D Ax : a.M : CT+ z]lqw = the unique d E A;*” such that for all a E A$ 
and W’SW, 
App:?(r ‘r;d)a = [I’, x : CT D M : tnl_r[ulx]w’. 
Combinators and extensionality guarantee that in the r D h : a M : CT+ z case, d 
exists and is unique. This is proved as in the classical setting, using translation 
into combinators [l, 9, 171 for existence, and extensionality for uniqueness. 
We can see the importance of partial environments by looking at the lambda 
abstraction case in a little more detail. The meaning of a lambda abstraction in 
environment 9 at w is determined by ‘patched’ environments ~[ulx] for a E A:, 
with w’ 2 w. If AZ is empty, but there exist many a EA$, then A:? may be 
large, and so there are many possible meanings for LX : a M. However, every 
rl[a/x] with a EA$ must be partial, since there is no possible value for x at w. 
Therefore, we need partial environments to determine the meaning of a lambda 
term uniquely. 
We say an equation r D M = N: CT holds at w and q, written 
wIE(rDM=N:a)[~], 
if, whenever w 1~ r[q], we have 
[rDM:aljrIw=[Z-DN:onqw. 
This is the base case of the inductive definition of w IF #[q] for formula @ of 
predicate logic, given earlier. It is an easy exercise, which we leave to the 
interested reader, to work out the complete definition of w It- @[n] for logical 
formulas written using type assignments (see [14, 231 for significant hints). 
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A model .& satisfies r D M = N : a, written & IF r D M = N : a, if every w and 
7 for & satisfy the equation. 
4. Kripke lambda models and Cartesian closed categories 
It is easy to extend the definitions of Kripke applicative structure and lambda 
model to include Cartesian product types o x z and a terminal type 1 with one 
element at each world. In this section, we will see that any Kripke model & with 
products and a terminal type determines a Cartesian closed category %&. As one 
would hope, the categorical interpretation of a term in r D M : o in %& coincides 
with the meaning of r D M : u in d given above. We will also sketch the full and 
faithful embedding of any small Cartesian closed category into a Cartesian closed 
category determined by a Kripke lambda model. This embedding preserves the 
Cartesian closed structure, but not necessarily ‘on the nose’. Rather than discuss 
all of the fine points, we will refer to the appropriate literature. The reader who is 
unfamiliar with category theory may skip to the next section without loss of 
continuity. 
We regard a partially-ordered set (“w‘, =z ) as a category in the usual way. 
Specifically, the objects of this category are the elements of “ur and there is a 
unique ‘less-than-or-equal-to’ arrow I,,,. from w to w’ iff w < w’. Since a 
category must have identities and be closed under composition, we let l,,, be the 
identity on w and define composition by 
1 w,w* 0 I,, w’ = I,, &+.“. 
Given a Kripke applicative structure &, it is easy to see that each type u 
determines a functor @, from ( W, 6) to sets. Specifically, we take 
Q,(w) = AZ, @O(L,,,) = CL,,, 
and use conditions (id) and (camp) in the definition of Kripke applicative 
structure to show that this map is functorial. While it may seem simplest to use 
functors @, as objects of %&, this may identify types in the case where o # r 
syntactically, but A: = AC happen to be the same set. Since we would not 
necessarily want to identify application functions on the two types, this could lead 
to unnecessary confusion. Therefore, we will use the type expressions as the 
objects of %‘&. 
Since each type determines a functor, we will use natural transformations as the 
morphisms of %&. For every pair of types cr and t, condition (nat) in the 
definition of Kripke applicative structure says that the map w ++ Appz”, which we 
shall write simply as App”,“, is a natural transformation from @,_, X @, to @,. 
Using App”, ‘, we can see that every global element a of type o+ r induces a 
natural transformation v from @, to a,, namely 
Y, = Appz”(a,, e). 
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For extensional applicative structures (and hence models), it is easy to see that if 
two global elements a and b determine the same natural transformation, then 
a,,, = 6, at every world w. We let the morphisms from o to t in %& be all natural 
transformations Y : @,+ @, induced by global elements of & of type o’--, r and 
let composition of morphisms be ordinary composition of natural transformations 
in Set(“+). 
A routine calculation shows that if J&! is a Kripke lambda model, then %& is a 
category with an object for each type, and there is a one-one correspondence 
between global elements of type o+ t in & and morphisms from u to t in %&. In 
addition, it is easy to show that %d is Cartesian closed if & has products and a 
terminal object. The relationship between the categorical interpretation of terms, 
as in [2313, and the meaning function we have given is summarized in the 
following theorem. Note that with product types, any TD M: t is easily 
transformed into a semantically equivalent x : (T D M’ : z with only one free 
variable. (Simply replace the collection of variables in r by a single variable of 
the appropriate product type.) 
Theorem 4.1. If d is a Kripke lambda model with products and terminal type, 
then the interpretation of x: CJ D M: t in %&, as defined in [23], is the natural 
transformation from @, to @, induced by the global element w H [Ax : u. M : CJ--, 
z]Bw, where 0 in the empty environment. 
Therefore an equation holds in .& iff it holds in Ce,. It should be pointed out 
that the functor from G& to Set(w.s), mapping t to @,, is faithful and preserves 
products, but it may not be full or may not preserve function spaces. The reason 
is that a Kripke lambda model is just a first-order structure in a topos of 
presheaves. Therefore, the interpretation @O_r of CJ* t need not be GO+ @,; 
extensionality only requires that @,, be a ‘subfunctor’ of CD,+ a,. 
We now sketch a method for defining a Kripke lambda model from any small 
Cartesian closed category. More specifically, we assume we are given an 
association of type constants to objects and term constants to arrows of a small 
Cartesian closed category D. Such an association determines an interpretation of 
typed lambda calculus in D, in the sense of [23]. We will show that there exists a 
Kripke lambda model 53 satisfying the same equations as D. In the special case 
that our categorical interpretation of typed lambda calculus is the internal 
language of D (see [14]), this construction gives us a Kripke lambda model 93 
which is equivalent to D (in the usual categorical sense), but not necessarily 
isomorphic. 
3 There is a minor source of confusion in [23, p. 4131. In assigning an arrow of a category to an open 
term M, we must decide which variables to consider free in M. In particular, we may want to consider 
some variables ‘vacuously’ free. Scott’s slightly informal discussion does not address this point. 
However, in the formalism of the present paper, we have explicit type assignments, and so we simply 
treat all variables in r as occurring free in r D M : a. 
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There are three steps from a small CCC to a Kripke lambda model. The first 
step transforms our categorical interpretation in D into a categorical interpreta- 
tion in SetDOp, the topos of presheaves over D. The second takes any categorical 
interpretation in a topos of presheaves SetDop and produces an applicative 
structure in the same category. This applicative structure satisfies (K), (S) and 
extensionality, which are all first-order expressible. The third step finds an 
elementarily equivalent applicative structure in Setw, where W is a poset with a 
least element. 
The first step uses the Yoneda embedding Y. of D into the topos of presheaves 
over D. This produces a categorical interpretation in the topos of presheaves over 
D, as spelled out in [23]. For instance, if d is the interpretation of the base type o 
in D, then we use Y,(d) as the interpretation of o in the topos of presheaves, and 
similarly for the interpretations of constants. This extends uniquely to all type 
expressions and terms. Since Y. preserves the Cartesian closed structure, the 
interpretation of any type and term in the topos of presheaves is the image (via 
Y,) of its interpretation in D. 
The categorical interpretation in the topos of presheaves over D gives us an 
applicative structure ~2 in the same topos. Specifically, d is the applicative 
structure with the type u interpreted as a functor @, from D”P to Set, and App”*” 
as the evaluation morphism eval,O,,z from (@,+ @,) x @, to @,. (Here we have 
@ (I-5 = a04 @,, as sets.) Moreover, the applicative structure .# satisfies the 
axioms (K), (S) and the extensionality condition (ext), according to the 
Kripke-Joyal semantics of formulas in SetDo’ (see [14]). 
We now have a lambda model & in SetDo’, but not necessarily a Kripke lambda 
model since Dop may not be a poset. The third step of the construction uses the 
Diaconescu cover. The general construction given in [12, Example 2.8 and 
Corollary 3.31 produces a poset W and a functor d: W += Dop such that any 
applicative structure & in Se? is elementarily equivalent to an applicative 
structure .% in SetW obtained by composing each functor and natural transforma- 
tion in d with d : W + Dep. In particular, d and 9? satisfy the same equations 
between typed lambda terms. However, it should be pointed out that, even when 
& is induced by a categorical interpretation of lambda terms (i.e., Qi,, = @, +- 
CD,), it does not follow that 8 is also induced by such an interpretation. 
In order to prove that D and ZB are equivalent, we show that D is equivalent 
to %‘& and Ce, is isomorphic to % a. However, the latter isomorphism requires a 
modification to the Diaconescu cover construction using the terminal object of D. 
To produce VZB isomorphic to %‘&, we take W in the definition to B to be the 
poset of finite composable sequences of morphisms in Dop, including the empty 
sequence I. This set is partially ordered by w1 6 w2 iff the sequence w1 is an 
initial segment of w,. This poset W is Pop of [12, Example 2.81, except that we 
have added the empty sequence. The functor d is defined as in [12], extended to 
I by mapping the empty sequence to the terminal object 1 of D. Note that there 
is exactly one way to extend d to morphisms from I to any w E W, because 1 is 
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the initial object in Pp. More explicitly, d is the functor from W to Dop such that 
for any sequence fi, . . . ,fn of composable maps (object of W), we let 
d(f,, . . . , ‘) = 1 the codomain off in Dop, n ztIez;se. 
If the sequence w’ is w followed by fi, . . . , fn, then d maps the unique arrow 
f,,,~:W-+W’ of wto 
d(l,,,.) = 
{ 
the only morphism from 1 to d(w’), if w = I, 
the identity on d(w), if it = 0, 
the composition of fi, . . . , fn, otherwise. 
Since the modified functor d: W --, Dop still satisfies the conditions of [12, 
Corollary 3.31, the modified 93 remains elementarily equivalent to .z4. Moreover, 
the global element of @f in SetDoP are in natural correspondence with the global 
elements of @f in Setw. In fact, this construction has the following properties: 
Setw(l, @$) = @:(I) by the Yoneda Lemma, 
QZW) = @Z(l) because @f = Qifod and d(l) = 1, 
SetDo’ @f) = @d(l) again by the Yoneda Lemma. 
Therefore the global elements of any type @f in & are in one-to-one 
correspondence with the global elements of the corresponding type @$ in $43. 
Since the two categories %& and (e, have the same set of objects, we may 
conclude that %& and %& are isomorphic. Specifically, the morphisms from o to r 
in either category are in one-one correspondence with the global elements of 
@ cl-z> and we know that the corresponding sets of global elements are in 
one-to-one correspondence, by the argument above. 
The two Cartesian closed categories % d and D are equivalent via the 
correspondence that maps an object u of %& to the interpretation [al of u in D. It 
is easy to see that @, = Y,([al), since this is clearly true for base types and 
preserved at higher types because @,,+ = @,+ Gz = Y&a+ ~1). By definition 
of ‘Gd and @0_s= @,* a,, we have %‘Ju, r) = SetDoP(QO, a,). Therefore 
%‘&a, r) is isomorphic to D([ul, [rn) by 
Y&T, t) = SetDop(GO, @,) = SeP”(Y,([o~), Y,(urn)) = D(uon, urn). 
Thus the Cartesian closed categories %& and D are equivalent. Since %& is 
isomorphic to %&, this completes the proof that the original category D and the 
category Ce, determined by Kripke lambda model 94 are equivalent. 
5. Soundness, completeness and inhabitation 
Using the relationships between Kripke lambda models and Cartesian closed 
categories described in the last section, the soundness and completeness theorems 
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for Kripke lambda models may be derived from well-known theorems about 
lambda calculus and Cartesian closed categories (see [14, Part I]). However, we 
will give a direct completeness proof since it is quite straightforward and the 
construction has other uses. 
The following lemmas are easily proved by induction on typed lambda terms. 
Lemma 5.1 (Transition Lemma). Let S$ be a Kripke lambda model and 7~ an 
environment satisfying Tat w. Then for every w’ 3 w, we have 
Lemma 5.2 (Substitution Lemma). Let s4 be a Kripke lambda model and q an 
environment satisfying Z at w. For any well-typed terms Z D N: o and Z, 
x:aDM:r, we have 
ur D [N/x]M: Z~VW = [r, x : u D M : t](q([r D N: u]lqw/x])w. 
It is now easy to prove soundness by induction on equational proofs. 
Lemma 5.3 (Soundness). Let 8 be a set of well-typed equations. Zf 8 I- r D M = 
N: a, then every model satisfying 8 also satisfies Z D M = N : CT, 
For Kripke lambda models, we prove deductive completeness by showing the 
stronger property that every theory has a model. 
Theorem 5.4 (Completeness). Let 8 be any set of equations closed under k. 
ThereisaKripkelambdamodeldwithoeI~TDM=N:uiffrDM=N:aE8. 
Proof. The completeness theorem is proved by constructing a term model 
d= (W, s, @GE], {APPZ”), {iE+, }) in the following way. 
l W is the poset of finite type assignments r ordered by inclusion. In what 
follows, we will write rfor an arbitrary element of W. 
l A; is the set of all [r D M: a], where I’D M: u is well-typed, and 
[rDM:u]={rDN:uI %tTDM=N:u} 
is the equivalence class of r D M : u with respect to 8. 
l AppF”([rD M:u +z],[rDN:u])=[rDMN:r]. 
l i;,rr([T D M: u]) = [r’ D MU] for r E r’. 
It is easy to check that the definition makes sense, and that we have global 
elements K and S at all appropriate types. For example, 
K = [ilx : CT. lzy : KX]. 
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The proof of extensionality is a little more interesting. Suppose that [r D A4 : CT+ 
z] and [r D N: CT+ z] have the same functional behavior, i.e., for all r’ 3 r and 
I”D P:a, we have 
[I-’ D MPt] = [I-’ D NP : r]. 
Then, in particular, for r’ = r, x : CJ with x not in r, we have 
[r,x:oDMx:t]=[T,x:aDNx:s], 
and so by rule (g) and axiom (n), we have [r D M: CT+ T] = [r D N: CT+ t]. 
Thus .# is a Kripke lambda model. 
It remains to show that & satisfies precisely the equations belonging to 8. We 
begin by relating the interpretation of a term to its equivalence class. If r is any 
type assignment, we may define an environment n by 
qd-t = 
C 
[r’Dx:o], if.x:oErsr’, 
undefined, otherwise. 
A straightforward induction on terms shows that for any r’ 2 r’ 2 r, we have 
[r’DM:a]lqT”=[r”DM:a]. 
In particular, whenever .~4 satisfies an equation r D M = N : a, we have r It- r[ 71 
by construction of n, and so 
[rDM:a]=[rDN:a]. 
Since this reasoning applies to every r, every equation satisfied by & must be 
provable from 8. 
While it is possible to show that & satisfies every equation in 8 directly, by 
similar reasoning, certain complications may be avoided by restricting our 
attention to closed terms. There is no loss of generality in doing so, since it easy 
to prove the closed equation 
0 D AX, : o1 - ..lZXk:~~.M=hrl:a,...lZXk:~~.N 
from the equation 
xi:oi,. . . , xk:ukDM=N 
between open terms, and vice versa. For any closed equation 0 D M = N: r E $, 
we have 
for any r, by rule (add var). Therefore, for every world r of ~4, the two 
equivalence classes [r D M : z] and [r D N: t] will be identical. Since the 
meaning of 0 D M : z in any environment n at world r will be [r D M : z], and 
similarly for 0 D N: t, it follows that & satisfies 0 D M = N: t. This proves the 
theorem. 0 
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One important property of the Kripke term model we construct in the 
completeness proof is that AZ is nonempty for all w E W iff o is an intuitionisti- 
tally provable proposition. Our interest in this property stems from a well-known 
syntactic correspondence between typed lambda calculus and intuitionistic logic, 
called the formulas-as-types principle, or Curry-Howard isomorphism [lo]. In 
this analogy, types correspond to logical formulas and terms correspond to 
proofs. We read basic types as atomic propositions and read the type o+ t of 
functions from cr to t as the formula ‘u implies t’. The crucial part of this analogy 
is that since lambda terms are a notational variant of intuitionistic natural 
deduction proofs, there is a closed term of type CJ iff u is an intuitionistically 
provable formula. Based on this syntactic correspondence between terms and 
proofs, we might expect there to be a semantic interpretation in which the 
nonempty types correspond to the intuitionistically provable formulas. The term 
model construction may be used to prove the following correspondence between 
provability and type inhabitation. 
Theorem 5.5 (Inhabitation). Let .Z be a set of typed constants and 8 an 
equational theory over .Z. There is a Kripke lambda model ~4 for ‘8 with the 
following property: AZ is nonempty for all w E 7if iff the type a, when viewed as an 
implicational formula, is intuitionistically provable from the types of constants in 
2. 
This theorem stands in sharp contrast to the correspondence we achieve with 
classical models. To construct a classical model with only the provable types 
nonempty, we must begin with each base type nonempty, since no atomic 
proposition is provable. It is easy to see that if CJ and r each have at most one 
element, then o--, r has at most one element, and so a straightforward induction 
shows that our model must have at most one element of each type. Consequently, 
every well-typed equation will be satisfied. 
Another way to connect nonemptiness with provability is to consider classes of 
models. If we consider the class of full classical type hierarchies, with some base 
types empty and others not, then the types which are nonempty in every model 
are the classical propositional tautologies [3]. 
6. Kripke logical relations 
6.1. Relations over applicative structures 
Logical relations have proven useful in the study of Henkin lambda models. 
For example, we may prove the completeness of pure p,t,r-conversion (without 
equational hypotheses) for many specific classical models, and characterize the 
lambda definable elements of certain models using logical relations [21, 24-261. 
In [21], Plotkin introduced I-relations, which are families of typed relations over a 
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Henkin model, indexed by possible worlds. In this section, we will consider 
Kripke logical relations, which are the straightforward generalization of I- 
relations to Kripke lambda models. 
In the classical model theory of typed lambda calculus, a logical relation is a 
family of relations indexed by types which satisfies a condition implying closure 
under application and lambda abstraction. The generalization to Kripke applica- 
tive structures involves indexing relations by both types and possible worlds. We 
will simplify our presentation by assuming a fixed structure ( W, 6) throughout 
Section 6. 
A Kripke logical relation over Kripke applicative structures & and !33 (using the 
same ( w, c)) is a family 9 = {Z?:} of relations Rz G A”, x Bz indexed by types 
cr and worlds w E w satisfying the following two conditions. The first is a 
monotonicity condition for any base type c: 
RC,(a, b) implies R’,.(i”,,,.a, i”,,,,b) for all w < w’, (mon) 
which says that when w c w’, the relation R”, is contained in R’,., modulo the 
transition functions. The second condition 
R:+“(f, g) iff VW’ 3 w Vu, b EA$ R”,,(u, b) implies R:,((iZyWTf)u, (iEyWTg)b), 
(cmpre) 
called ‘comprehension’, says that relative to the functions available from d and 
$3, the relation Rz+” contains all functions mapping related arguments to related 
results. The two lemmas below are proved using essentially the same arguments 
as outlined in [21]. 
Lemma 6.1 (Monotonicity). Let 2. E .I& X 33 be a Kripke logical relation. Then 
for every type o and pair of worlds w s w’, if Rz(u, b), then R$(i&,,.u, iE,,,-b). 
We say environments na, qb are related by 93 on rut w if R:(QJw, r]bxw) for 
all x : t in r. 
Lemma 6.2 (Basic Lemma). If .% G ~4 X 94 is a Kripke logical relation over 
models ~4 and .5% and environments qn, qb are related by 3 on r at w, then for 
every term r D M: (7, we have Rz(.&‘[r D M : o]q,w, .%[r D M : o]r](,w). 
As with many of our definitions, the definition of Kripke logical relation may 
be derived by interpreting the usual definition in the topos SetCsY.=). The usual 
definition of logical relation 6% E d x 92 is a family of relations R”s A” x B” 
such that 
R”“(f, g) iff Vx EA”V~ E B”R”(x, y) 3 R”(fx, gy). (usual) 
To re-interpret this condition, we must first say what Kripke relations are. As we 
have seen, a type, or ‘Kripke set’, is a family A = {A,} of sets indexed by worlds, 
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with transition functions ii,,,, for each w < w’. (Or, equivalently, a functor from 
( W, G) to sets.) If we have two such Kripke sets A = {A,} and B = {B,}, then a 
Kripke relation R GA x B is a subset of A x B = {A, x B,}, i.e., a family 
R = {R,} of relations R, c A, x B, such that 
R,(a, b) implies R,(ie,,,a, i&,,,b) for all w G w’. 
Thus condition (mon) is built into the definition of Set(“Ys). If we now say that a 
Kripke logical relation over & and $33 should be a family of Kripke relations 
R”cA”x B” satisfying (usual) above, then it only remains to check (cmpre). 
This is obtained by working out the Kripke (i.e., Set(“,<)) interpretation of the 
standard comprehension condition (usual). 
6.2. Partial equivalence relations and quotients 
A Kripke logical partial equivalence relation 24 E d x & is a Kripke logical 
relation such that each RG is symmetric and transitive. The name partial 
equivalence relation comes from the fact that if Rz is symmetric and transitive, 
then Rz is an equivalence relation on the set of a with RE(a, a). We will 
abbreviate the cumbersome phrase ‘Kripke logical partial equivalence relation’ to 
klper. The following lemma shows that klpers may be constructed by choosing 
relations at base types. 
Lemma 6.3 (Partial Equivalence). Let 9. E ~4 x .& be a Kripke logical relation. Zf 
each R”, is symmetric and transitive, for each base type c and world w E W, then 
every Rg is symmetric and transitive. 
One use of partial equivalence relations is in forming quotient structures. With 
partial equivalence relations, reflexivity fails, and so an element need not have an 
equivalence class. Therefore, it might be more accurate to call these ‘partial 
quotients’. If 
sB=(W,+ (43, {AppZ”], {CL,>) 
is a Kripke applicative structure and % c Sp x & is a klper, then we define the 
quotient applicative structure 
&4/%=(W,S, (AEIR3, {AppZ”/%), {G,,~l~) > 
as follows. 
l A$/RZ = {[cl% 1 K.Z(a, a)>, where [a]% is the equivalence class [a]% = {a’ E 
A: 1 K-3, a’)>; 
l (APP:“/~) [~Iw Ply, = ]App:“a bl%; 
l (C,,,/%) [a], = [CL, aI%. 
It is a simple exercise to verify that the quotient structure is well-defined, and a 
Kripke applicative structure. 
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Lemma 6.4. If $8 c d x & is a Kripke partial equivalence relation over Kripke 
applicative structure ~4, then &/LB satisfies the Kripke extensionality condition 
(ext). 
A straightforward induction on terms may be used to prove the following 
‘quotient model’ theorem. 
Lemma 6.5. Zf .9l G d x d is a klper over Kripke lambda model &, then szZf .% is 
a Kripke lambda model such that for every environment n with R~(~xw, nxw) for 
all x : t in r, we have 
(d/C%)[T D M : o]qsew = [&[I- D M : ~]lrjw]~, 
where the environment na for L&/LB is defined by taking qvnxw = [rtxwlw for all x 
and w. 
In short, the meaning of a term M in the quotient model a/% is the 
equivalence class of the meaning of M in ~4. This theorem is an adaptation of the 
‘characterization theorem’ [19], which appears to be the first use of the idea. 
6.3. Kripke logical relations over classical applicative structures 
We now consider Kripke logical relations over classical applicative structures. 
The simplest way to do this is to regard classical structures as a special case of 
Kripke structures. To be specific, let Se = ({A”}, {App”‘“}) be a classical 
applicative structure, i.e., {A”} is a collection of sets indexed by types and 
{Appq”} is a collection of application functions. We define the Kripke structure 
dW= (W, G, ME], {APPZ”], {GwS>) 
by taking sets A”,=A”, application functions Appz’ = App”‘” and transition 
functions iz,,, = identity. It is easy to check that dw is a Kripke lambda model 
whenever & is a classical ambda model, and that the meaning of a term M in d w 
is essentially the same as the meaning of M in ~4. In categorical terms, dw is an 
applicative structure of constant presheaves. 
We say % = {RE} is a Kripke logical relation over classical applicative structures 
JJZ and ?4? if C-J? is a Kripke logical relation over dw and SW. This amounts to the 
same thing as Plotkin’s definition of Z-relation, except for the minor difference 
that we have used applicative structures instead of models (cf. [21]). By Lemma 
6.5, we can produce Kripke models by taking Kripke quotients of classical 
models. 
Corollary 6.6. If d is a classical typed lambda model and 9 is a klper over &, 
then sQ/$% is a Kripke lambda model. 
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This gives us a fairly simple class of models with intuitionistic properties. In 
fact, we can show that every lambda theory is the theory of a model of this form. 
Theorem 6.7. Let 8 be any set of equations closed under t. There exists a classical 
lambda model d and a Kripke partial equivalence relation % such that &I92 
satisfies precisely those equations that belong to 8. 
Proof. Let d be the Kripke term model for 8, as in the proof of Theorem 5.4. 
We will show that & is isomorphic to a quotient of the open term model $23 of 
/3, n-conversion. 
We will review the classical term model construction briefly. Let r, be an 
infinite type assignment that provides infinitely many variables of each type. For 
each type a, let B” be the collection of all equivalence classes {M} with r D M : (J 
for some finite r G I& and 
{M}={N)WDM=N:a} 
for some r G L. Let 92 = ( {B”}, {Appq”} be the applicative structure with 
Appq”{M}{N} = {MN}. 
This is easily shown to be an ordinary typed lambda model. More details of the 
term model construction may be found in [5], for example. 
Using 8, we can define a klper .%! over 3’. Since the possible worlds of .# are 
type assignments, we will use type assignments as the worlds of ‘3. For each o 
and r, let 
R%{M}, {N}) iff rDM”=N”:o~ZT, 
where M” is the /I, n-normal form of M, and similarly for No. This is well defined 
since each {M} has a unique /3,~-normal form, by the Church-Rosser theorem. 
Since provable equality is symmetric and transitive with respect to any r, 9 is 
clearly a partial equivalence relation. (In general, RF will not be reflexive on B’-‘, 
since some MO may require variables not in r.) By rule (add var), 2 satisfies the 
monotonicity condition (mon). The proof that $3 satisfies (cmpre) is similar to the 
proof that Kripke term models are extensional. 
It remains easy to show that .Y$ is isomorphic to .%/92. Every B”/R”, 
equivalence class is characterized by a collection of normal forms that are all well 
typed in r and provably equal using 8. Thus for each B”/R”, equivalence class 
{M}/R;, there is a unique [r D MO: a] EAT. Conversely, all of the p, q-normal 
forms in any [r D MO: a] will be equivalent modulo R& and so we have a 
straightforward bijection between A” and B”/Rg It is easy to show that 
application behaves appropriately, and so we have an isomorphism between & 
and .3/9% This proves the theorem. Cl 
However, we can show that some Kripke lambda models are not isomorphic to 
any Kripke quotient of any classical applicative structure. 
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Theorem 6.8. There is a Kripke lambda model 93 which is not elementarily 
equivalent to ~/?iZ, for any classical applicative structure ~4 and Kripke partial 
equivalence relation 9. 
Proof. We give a formula C#J in the predicate logic for applicative structures with 
base types p and q which is valid in all quotients &!/LB but is not valid in every 
Kripke lambda model 93. Intuitively, r#~ is the formula that says: 
if empty(p) and -Cnhabited(p + q), then inhabited(p 4 q), 
where inhabited(r) = (3x : KX = x) and empty(t) = -Cnhabited( r). It is easy to 
check that this holds in any quotient of a classical applicative structure. 
To show that $I is not intuitionistically valid, we consider the following Kripke 
lambda model 93: 
l w’ is the poset with two elements 0 < 1; 
l 53 at 1 is the full type structure with the base type p = 0 and q = o; 
l 93 at 0 is the interior of 5% at 1, i.e., the applicative substructure whose 
elements are interpretations of closed A-terms; 
l the transition function i,,1 is the inclusion. 
Then Ap’4 contains exactly one element (the empty function), and therefore $33 
satisfies ninhabited(p + q); but A{-q is empty (because there are no closed 
terms of that type), so 93 does not satisfy inhabited(p+q). 0 
6.4. A counter-model to implication (*) 
As an application of Kripke quotients, we will show how to construct a 
counter-model to the implication (*) given in the Introduction. We will construct 
a Henkin model d with base types a and b and give a Kripke logical partial 
equivalence relation 3 E d x ~4 such that in the quotient model &l.%, we will 
have 
hr : a.fxI = Lx : a.fnz but not fxl = f3t2. 
We let d be a classical term model of #I,q-conversion, as described in the proof 
of Theorem 6.7. Since f appears in the equations above, we include terms with 
constant f : (a + a --, a) --, b in constructing &. (The interpretation off in .vZ is its 
equivalence class, modulo l-.) 
It remains to define the relation 93 at base types, since this will determine 92 at 
higher types. Since the justification of (*) depends on type a being either globally 
empty or globally nonempty, we will make a empty at one world and nonempty at 
another. We let w= (0, l} with 0~ 1 and take R; = 0 and Rq the identity 
relation A”. Now, we want to satisfy equation 
Ax : a.fnI = hx : a.fz2 (E) 
at both worlds. This is easy at world 0, since a is empty. We can take Rg to be the 
identity relation on Ab. To satisfy (E) at world 1 where a is not empty, we must 
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equate fnl and fn2. An easy way to do this is just to take Rf = Ab x Ab so that 
Ab/Rf has only one element. It is easy to verify that 
RET'b(Ax ;a.fn,, Ax :a.fnJ 
at both worlds w = 0, 1, and so these terms are equal in the quotient model. 
However, since fnl and fn2 are not /?,r~-equivalent, hey are not related by R& 
and so the equation frill = fnz does not hold at world 0 in the quotient model. 
Consequently, d/.9? satisfies (E), but not fq = fn2. 
7. Conclusion and directions for further investigation 
While the traditional axiom system is not complete for semantic implication 
over Henkin models, we have completeness for Kripke models. Since Kripke 
models satisfy intuitionistic principles, but not the law of the excluded middle 
($ v l@), this may be interpreted as evidence that typed lambda calculus is more 
an intuitionistic system than a classical one. In addition, we have a straightfor- 
ward correspondence between provable propositions and nonempty types, which 
suggests that Kripke models may be useful for studying systems like Martin-Lof’s 
type theory (cf. [2]). It is easy to see that Kripke lambda models are more general 
than classical ambda models, since any classical ambda model may be regarded 
as a Kripke lambda model over a set Yif consisting of a single possible world. 
Kripke models with products u x t and a terminal type 1 are also a special kind of 
Cartesian closed category and, conversely, any Cartesian closed category may be 
embedded in a Kripke model. 
Although we defined Kripke models without using much category theory, one 
way to view our development is as a ‘worked example’ in the use of the internal 
language of a topos. Specifically, our Kripke lambda models result from 
interpreting the standard classical definition of typed lambda model in the logic of 
a topos of presheaves over a poset. In addition, as pointed out to us by Edmund 
Robinson and Pino Rosolini, our completeness theorem may be derived using 
connections between Cartesian closed categories and presheaf toposes. Our study 
of Kripke logical relations may also be viewed this way using the standard notion 
of relation in the internal logic. 
Our brief investigation of Kripke logical relations suggest that many classical 
model-theoretic techniques may be adapted to Kripke lambda models, and 
demonstrates that Plotkin’s I-relations provide a useful class of ‘intuitionistic’ 
lambda models. We have shown that every typed lambda theory is the theory of 
some Kripke quotient of a classical lambda model, but that this does not carry 
over to quantified formulas. Specifically, we found a formula # which is valid in 
Kripke quotient models, but not in all Kripke lambda models. 
In general, our main focus has been on theoretical aspects of Kripke lambda 
models. Having found Kripke models relatively natural and easy to work with, it 
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is worth asking whether Kripke lambda models are appropriate to computer 
science applications. For example, do Kripke-like models arise naturally in the 
semantics of programming languages? One suggestion that they do comes from 
the study of storage allocation in Algol-like languages. John Reynolds and Frank 
Oles have proposed functors over ‘store-shapes’ as a mathematical semantics for 
languages which admit stack-structured storage allocation [20, 221. (Some related 
discussion appears in [27].) In addition to taking ‘storage maps’ as possible 
worlds, some other possibilities might be sets of declarations (as in our 
completeness proof), program contexts, or their meanings. Given the differences 
between Henkin models and functor categories, it seems worthwhile to 
reconsider carefully which are more natural for the semantics of programs. 
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